ਗੋਲਾਨ ਉਚਾਈਆਂ

ਗੋਲਾਨ ਉਚਾਈਆਂ

هضبة الجولان
רמת הגולן
ਗੋਲਾਨ ਉਚਾਈਆਂ هضبة الجولان; רמת הגולן
	ਗੋਲਾਨ ਉਚਾਈਆਂ ਦਾ ਟਿਕਾਣਾ
ਖੇਤਰ
• ਕੁੱਲ	1,800 km2 (700 sq mi)
• ਇਜ਼ਰਾਇਲ ਦੇ ਕਬਜ਼ੇ ਹੇਠ	1,200 km2 (500 sq mi)
• ਸੰਯੁਕਤ ਰਾਸ਼ਟਰ ਦੇ ਕਬਜ਼ੇ ਹੇਠ	235 km2 (91 sq mi)
Highest elevation	2,814 m (9,232 ft)
Lowest elevation	−212 m (−695.5 ft)
ਸਮਾਂ ਖੇਤਰ	ਯੂਟੀਸੀ+2
• ਗਰਮੀਆਂ (ਡੀਐਸਟੀ)	ਯੂਟੀਸੀ+3

ਗੋਲਾਨ ਉਚਾਈਆਂ (ਅਰਬੀ: هضبة الجولان Haḍbatu 'l-JawlānHaḍbatu 'l-Jawlān or مرتفعات الجولان Murtafaʻātu l-JawlānMurtafaʻātu l-Jawlān, ਇਬਰਾਨੀ: רמת הגולן‎, Ramat HaGolanRamat HaGolan (audio)^ⓘ), ਜਾਂ ਸਿਰਫ਼ ਗੋਲਾਨ,^[1] ਸ਼ਾਮ ਵਿਚਲਾ ਇੱਕ ਇਲਾਕਾ ਹੈ। ਇਸਦਾ ਪੱਛਮੀ ਦੋ-ਤਿਹਾਈ ਇਜ਼ਰਾਇਲ ਅਧੀਨ ਹੈ, ਅਤੇ ਪੂਰਬੀ ਇੱਕ-ਤਿਹਾਈ ਸੀਰੀਆ ਅਧੀਨ ਹੈ।

ਅੰਤਰ-ਰਾਸ਼ਟਰੀ ਰਾਇ ਮੁਤਾਬਕ ਇਹ ਇਲਾਕਾ ਸੀਰੀਆ ਦਾ ਹਿੱਸਾ ਹੈ, ਪਰ 1967 ਤੋਂ ਹੀ ਇਸ ਉੱਤੇ ਇਜ਼ਰਾਇਲ ਨੇ ਕਬਜ਼ਾ ਕੀਤਾ ਹੋਇਆ ਹੈ।

19 ਜੂਨ 1967 ਨੂੰ ਇਜ਼ਰਾਇਲ ਦੀ ਕੈਬਿਨੇਟ ਨੇ ਸ਼ਾਂਤੀ ਸੰਧੀ ਦੇ ਬਦਲੇ ਵਿੱਚ ਇਹ ਇਲਾਕਾ ਵਾਪਸ ਕਰਨ ਦਾ ਨਿਹਚਾ ਕੀਤਾ, ਪਰ 1 ਸਤੰਬਰ 1967 ਵਿੱਚ ਇਸ ਵਾਅਦੇ ਤੋਂ ਪਿੱਛੇ ਹਟ ਗਏ।^[2]^[3] 1973 ਵਿੱਚ ਸੀਰੀਆ ਨੇ ਇਸ ਇਲਾਕੇ ਉੱਤੇ ਮੁੜ ਅਧਿਕਾਰ ਜਮਾਉਣ ਦੀ ਨਾਕਾਮ ਕੋਸ਼ਿਸ਼ ਕੀਤੀ, ਜਿਸਤੋਂ ਬਾਅਦ ਇਜ਼ਰਾਇਲ ਇਸਦਾ ਤਕਰੀਬਨ 5% ਵਾਪਸ ਕਰਨਾ ਮੰਨ ਗਿਆ। ਇਸ ਵਾਪਸ ਕੀਤੇ ਇਲਾਕੇ ਵਿੱਚ ਸੰਯੁਕਤ ਰਾਸ਼ਟਰ ਨੇ ਇੱਕ ਬਫ਼ਰ ਜ਼ੋਨ ਦਾ ਨਿਰਮਾਣ ਕੀਤਾ, ਅਤੇ ਇਹ ਸੰਯੁਕਤ ਰਾਸ਼ਟਰ ਦੇ ਫ਼ੌਜੀ ਕਬਜ਼ੇ ਅਧੀਨ ਹੈ।

ਹਵਾਲੇ

↑ "Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan". Human Rights Council. United Nations General Assembly. 27 ਫ਼ਰਵਰੀ 2009. Archived from the original on 24 February 2012. Retrieved 19 December 2011. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
↑ Dunstan, Simon (2009). The Six Day War 1967: Jordan and Syria. Osprey. Archived from the original on 2016-01-18. Retrieved 2017-01-26. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |dead-url= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
↑ Herzog, Chaim, The Arab।sraeli Wars, New York: Random House (1982) p.190-191
Moshe Gat (2003). Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964-1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 101. ISBN 978-0-275-97514-2. Retrieved 7 September 2013. [on 1965] "Nasser too, assured the American under Secretary of state, Philip Talbot, that the Arabs would not exceed the water quotas prescribed by the Johnston plan"
Sosland, Jeffrey (2007) Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin, SUNY Press,।SBN 0-7914-7201-9 p 70
The UNRWA commissioned a plan for the development of the Jordan River; this became widely known as “The Johnston plan”. The plan was modelled on the Tennessee Valley Authority development plan for the development of the Jordan River as a single unit. Greg Shapland, (1997) Rivers of Discord:।nternational Water Disputes in the Middle East, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers,।SBN 1-85065-214-7 p 14
Avi Shlaim (2000). The।ron Wall:।srael and the Arab World. Penguin Books. pp. 229, 230. ISBN 978-0-14-028870-4. In January 1964 an Arab League summit meeting convened in Cairo. The main item on the agenda was the threat posed by।srael's diversion of water … The preamble to its decision stated: "The establishment of।srael is the basic threat that the Arab nation in its entirety has agreed to forestall. And Since the existence of।srael is a danger that threatens the Arab nation, the diversion of the Jordan waters by it multiplies the dangers to Arab existence. Accordingly, the Arab states have to prepare the plans necessary for dealing with the political, economic and social aspects, so that if necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they are not completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of।srael
Masahiro Murakami (1995). Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East; Alternative Strategies. United Nations University Press. pp. 287–297. ISBN 978-92-808-0858-2. Retrieved 15 July 2013. The book appears in: http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80858e/80858E0m.htm . The initial diversion capacity of the National Water Carrier without supplementary booster pumps was 320 million m3, well within the limits of the Johnston Plan. ......Shortly before completion of the।sraeli Water Carrier in 1964, an Arab summit conference decided to try to thwart it. Discarding direct military attack, the Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwater......the Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwaters.......diversion of both the Hasbani and the Banias to the Yarmouk.....According to neutral assessments, the scheme was only marginally feasible; it was technically difficult and expensive......Political considerations cited by the Arabs in rejecting the 1955 Johnston Plan were revived to justify the diversion scheme. Particular emphasis was placed on the Carrier's capability to enhance।srael's capacity to absorb immigrants to the detriment of Palestinian refugees.।n response,।srael stressed that the National Water Carrier was within the limits of the Johnston Plan......the Arabs started work on the Headwater Diversion project in 1965.।srael declared that it would regard such diversion as an infringement of its sovereign rights. According to estimates, completion of the project would have deprived।srael of 35% of its contemplated withdrawal from the upper Jordan, constituting one-ninth of।srael's annual water budget.......In a series of military strikes,।srael hit the diversion works. The attacks culminated in April 1967 in air strikes deep inside Syria. The increase in water-related Arab-Israeli hostility was a major factor leading to the June 1967 war. {{cite book}}: External link in |quote= (help)

ਹਵਾਲੇ ਵਿੱਚ ਗ਼ਲਤੀ:<ref> tag with name "Gat2003p101" defined in <references> is not used in prior text.ਹਵਾਲੇ ਵਿੱਚ ਗ਼ਲਤੀ:<ref> tag with name "Sosland2007p70" defined in <references> is not used in prior text.ਹਵਾਲੇ ਵਿੱਚ ਗ਼ਲਤੀ:<ref> tag with name "shapland1997p14" defined in <references> is not used in prior text.ਹਵਾਲੇ ਵਿੱਚ ਗ਼ਲਤੀ:<ref> tag with name "Shlaim2000p229" defined in <references> is not used in prior text.ਹਵਾਲੇ ਵਿੱਚ ਗ਼ਲਤੀ:<ref> tag with name "Murakami1995p287" defined in <references> is not used in prior text.

[UNSyrianGolan-1] "Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan". Human Rights Council. United Nations General Assembly. 27 ਫ਼ਰਵਰੀ 2009. Archived from the original on 24 February 2012. Retrieved 19 December 2011. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)

[Dunstan-2] Dunstan, Simon (2009). The Six Day War 1967: Jordan and Syria. Osprey. Archived from the original on 2016-01-18. Retrieved 2017-01-26. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |dead-url= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)

[3] Herzog, Chaim, The Arab।sraeli Wars, New York: Random House (1982) p.190-191

[Gat2003p101-4] Moshe Gat (2003). Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964-1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 101. ISBN 978-0-275-97514-2. Retrieved 7 September 2013. [on 1965] "Nasser too, assured the American under Secretary of state, Philip Talbot, that the Arabs would not exceed the water quotas prescribed by the Johnston plan"

[Sosland2007p70-5] Sosland, Jeffrey (2007) Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin, SUNY Press,।SBN 0-7914-7201-9 p 70

[shapland1997p14-6] The UNRWA commissioned a plan for the development of the Jordan River; this became widely known as “The Johnston plan”. The plan was modelled on the Tennessee Valley Authority development plan for the development of the Jordan River as a single unit. Greg Shapland, (1997) Rivers of Discord:।nternational Water Disputes in the Middle East, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers,।SBN 1-85065-214-7 p 14

[Shlaim2000p229-7] Avi Shlaim (2000). The।ron Wall:।srael and the Arab World. Penguin Books. pp. 229, 230. ISBN 978-0-14-028870-4. In January 1964 an Arab League summit meeting convened in Cairo. The main item on the agenda was the threat posed by।srael's diversion of water … The preamble to its decision stated: "The establishment of।srael is the basic threat that the Arab nation in its entirety has agreed to forestall. And Since the existence of।srael is a danger that threatens the Arab nation, the diversion of the Jordan waters by it multiplies the dangers to Arab existence. Accordingly, the Arab states have to prepare the plans necessary for dealing with the political, economic and social aspects, so that if necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they are not completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of।srael

[Murakami1995p287-8] Masahiro Murakami (1995). Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East; Alternative Strategies. United Nations University Press. pp. 287–297. ISBN 978-92-808-0858-2. Retrieved 15 July 2013. The book appears in: http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80858e/80858E0m.htm . The initial diversion capacity of the National Water Carrier without supplementary booster pumps was 320 million m3, well within the limits of the Johnston Plan. ......Shortly before completion of the।sraeli Water Carrier in 1964, an Arab summit conference decided to try to thwart it. Discarding direct military attack, the Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwater......the Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwaters.......diversion of both the Hasbani and the Banias to the Yarmouk.....According to neutral assessments, the scheme was only marginally feasible; it was technically difficult and expensive......Political considerations cited by the Arabs in rejecting the 1955 Johnston Plan were revived to justify the diversion scheme. Particular emphasis was placed on the Carrier's capability to enhance।srael's capacity to absorb immigrants to the detriment of Palestinian refugees.।n response,।srael stressed that the National Water Carrier was within the limits of the Johnston Plan......the Arabs started work on the Headwater Diversion project in 1965.।srael declared that it would regard such diversion as an infringement of its sovereign rights. According to estimates, completion of the project would have deprived।srael of 35% of its contemplated withdrawal from the upper Jordan, constituting one-ninth of।srael's annual water budget.......In a series of military strikes,।srael hit the diversion works. The attacks culminated in April 1967 in air strikes deep inside Syria. The increase in water-related Arab-Israeli hostility was a major factor leading to the June 1967 war. {{cite book}}: External link in |quote= (help)

[1]

[2]

[3]